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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Stability  of  the  banking  system  and  macroprudential  regulation  are  essential  for  healthy  economic
growth.  In this  paper  we study  the  European  bank  network  and  its  vulnerability  to  stressing  different
bank  assets.  The  importance  of  macroprudential  policy  is emphasized  by  the  inherent  vulnerability  of
the  financial  system,  high  level  of leverage,  interconnectivity  of  system’s  entities,  similar  risk  exposure
of  financial  institutions,  and  susceptibility  for systemic  crisis  propagation  through  the  system.  Current
stress  tests  conducted  by  the European  Banking  Authority  do not  take  in consideration  the  connectivity
of  the  banks  and the  potential  of  one  bank  vulnerability  spilling  over  to the  rest  of  the  system.  We  create
a bipartite  network  with  bank  nodes  on  one  hand  and  asset  nodes  on the  other  with  weighted  links
between  the  two  layers  based  on  the  level  of  different  countries’  sovereign  debt  holdings  by each  bank.
We  propose  a model  for systemic  risk  propagation  based  on  common  bank  exposures  to  specific  asset
classes.  We introduce  the  similarity  in  asset  distribution  among  the  banks  as  a measure  of  bank  closeness.
We  link  the  closeness  of asset  distributions  to the  likelihood  that banks  will experience  a  similar  level
and  type  of distress  in  a given  adverse  scenario.  We  analyze  the  dynamics  of  tier  1 capital  ratio  after
stressing  the  bank  network  and  find  that while  the  system  is  able  to withstand  shocks  for a wide  range
of  parameters,  we  identify  a  critical  threshold  for both  asset  risk  and  bank  response  to  a  shock  beyond
which  the  system  transitions  from  stable  to unstable.











In today’s interconnected world the financial system with
increased global reach is becoming more vulnerable to interna-
tional corporate, household, and sovereign exposures. Drawing
national business boundaries for banks has become a difficult
task. Even though in general banks still have significant expo-
sures to domestic economies, the largest financial institutions have
a substantial international presence. Systemic risk describes the
vulnerability of a system, like the bank network, as a whole to
exogenous and endogenous shocks. If not understood and closely
monitored, these shocks can wipe out significant parts of a sys-
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em. Therefore, monitoring the vulnerabilities of banks globally is
ighly important for policymakers. Stress tests are an important
ool for determining the fragility of banks under adverse scenarios.
hile there are many factors that determine the health of financial
nstitutions, (i) adequate level of capital and (ii) high quality liq-
id assets are two main aspects to consider when assessing banks’
tability. Additionally, (iii) examining the interconnectivity among
anks plays an important role in determining the macroprudential
ragility of the network.
In this paper we address all three important factors from above
nd demonstrate that if banks are well capitalized, hold liquid high
uality assets, and maintain well-balanced portfolios in relation
o other banks, we can expect better overall stability of indi-
idual banks as well as the banking system as a whole. While
he first two factors are well studied (Moyer, 1990; Beltratti and
tulz, 2012; Calice et al., 2013; Distinguin et al., 2013; Miles et al.,
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2013; European Central Bank, 2014; DeYoung and Jang, 2016), we
offer a novel insight into the importance of the network structure
and dynamics of the system of international financial institutions
through the study of the third factor.
We  propose a bipartite network model of banks on one hand and
assets on the other and test the stability of the network under spe-
cific adverse scenarios. The links between the banks are established
indirectly through common exposures to asset classes such as cor-
porate loans or commercial real estate loans, and the weights of the
links are approximated based on bank exposures to sovereign debt
of different countries. Our model has two parameters: (i) size of the
initial shock to the banking system, and (ii) spreading or spillover
parameter, which we identify as a measure of systemic risk. The ini-
tial shock reduces bank capital or increases the risk weights of bank
assets. Both types of shocks cause a deterioration in the tier 1 capital
ratio, which is used as benchmark to assess proper capitalization of
financial institutions. This deterioration prompts a response from
the affected banks which can further distress other parts of the sys-
tem. We  confirm, in accordance with Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and
Glasserman and Young (2015), that any spillover effect in a linear
system is not significant, and it is bounded by the initial shock to
the system, i.e., no systemic effect is observed through network
spreading dynamics. To investigate the conditions when systemic
risk propagates through the banking network, we introduce non-
linearity in our model. We  simulate a non-linear bank response to
a loss of equity or an increase of specific asset risk weights. In the
non-linear scenario, we observe increased fragility of the banking
system. The spreading parameter which describes asset vulnera-
bility to risk is a critical parameter that separates the stable from
the unstable regime of the system.
2. Literature review
Central banks often work in concert to steer the financial system
towards stability. Just recently, researchers from 13 central banks
joined efforts to study data from 25 different markets to under-
stand how to reconstruct exposures in financial networks (Anand
et al., 2017). Financial crises such as the sub-prime credit crisis of
2007–2009 and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–2012
have revealed weaknesses in bank risk management practices as
well as softness in the global regulatory framework. As a response
to the economic system instabilities, regulators have focused on
strengthening liquidity and capital requirement rules to increase
the stability of the financial system and reduce the possibility of
major negative impact on global economy (Committee et al., 2010;
One Hundred Tenth Congress, 2010).
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has developed the
first Basel Capital Accord in 1988 to address apprehensions arising
from financial deregulation. The Basel III accord (endorsed by the
G20 countries in November 2010) responds to the need for effective
regulation to maintain the stability of the financial system in times
of economic downturns, such as the financial crisis of 2007–2009.
More specifically, Basel III calls for improvement in quantity and
quality of capital, redefines tier 1 capital, weighs on banks’ risk
management, and calls for capital buffer requirements to increase
the stability of the entire financial system (macroprudential reg-
ulation). Previous Basel regulations (I and II) have focused on the
stability of the financial system’s entities (microprudential regu-
lation), disregarding the systemic risk and the vulnerability of the
financial system to cascading failures. Similarly to Basel I and II,
Basel III maintains the requirement that banks hold total capital
of 8 percent of their risk-weighted assets (RWA). One of the main
differentiating aspects of Basel III however is the introduction of
a more stringent definition of tier 1 capital as a “going-concern”
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on  stock surplus, and retained earnings). Additionally, according
o Basel III, 75 percent of the total banks’ capital should consist of
ier 1 capital. Common equity tier 1 capital should account for at
east 4.5% of RWA  of the bank.
The RWA  are a fundamental input for Basel III capital require-
ents and are determined by an internal rating-based (IRB)
pproach that assesses counterparty credit risk (CCR). The majority
f banks use external credit ratings attributed to their counter-
arties. Large banking institutions, however, may  choose to use
nternal risk models to determine the capital needed to offset
pecific RWA, based on their estimates of exposures to loss or like-
ihood of loan defaults. (King and Tarbert, 2011; Padgett, 2012).
One of the challenges in macroprudential regulation is proper
isk assessment of financial institutions and ensuring that, on a sys-
emic level, the risk of network failure is minimized. Since the bank
isk is based on exposures to different sectors of the main economy
s well as the liquidity of the rest of the financial system, having an
ccurate assessment of asset risk factors as well as ensuring high
uality tier 1 capital is essential. The Basel Committee on Bank-
ng Supervision introduced the Basel III reforms in 2010 to address
he vulnerabilities in the financial system focusing on the liquidity
equirements expressed through the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
nd the Net Stable Finding Ratio (NSFR). Basel III stirred numerous
rguments between supporters of the reforms who argue that Basel
II will increase the stability of the financial system and opponents
ho claim that the reform will reduce credit availability and eco-
omic activity (Admati et al., 2011; Admati and Hellwig, 2011; Allen
t al., 2012; King, 2013; Miles et al., 2013).
Given that certain banks are allowed to use internal models for
alculating risk-weighted assets (RWA), and hence influence their
ier 1 capital ratios, it is not always possible to state the proper cap-
talization of banks with great confidence. The banks can influence
ier 1 capital ratios by holding assets weighted with a low risk that
ctually have higher risk. Additionally, there is a risk that asset risks
ight change over time. Moreover, correlations of banks’ shared
ortfolios are prone to increase and contribute to higher risk in the
anking system (Engle, 2009; Acharya et al., 2014; Caccioli et al.,
014; Brownlees and Engle, 2015; Corsi et al., 2016).
The establishment of the European Single Supervisory Mech-
nism (SSM) in November 2014 opened a new era of bank
upervision in the euro zone. The intention of the SSM has been to
armonize key areas of bank supervision and to contribute signif-
cantly towards the safety and resilience of the European banking
ystem. By conducting a comprehensive assessment of 130 banks
n the euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) has addressed
everal important objectives including: (i) strengthening bank bal-
nce sheets, (ii) enhancing transparency and improving quality
f information regarding bank conditions, as well as (iii) building
onfidence by assuring banks’ appropriate capitalization after com-
letion of necessary corrective actions. The 130 banks, involved
n the comprehensive assessment, account for D 22 trillion total
ssets or over 80% of total assets in the SSM as of December 2013
Authority, 2016). Similar efforts to regulate the financial system
ave been made in the US, most prominently in form of the Dodd-
rank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
One Hundred Tenth Congress, 2010). More recently though, there
ave been significant efforts by the new US administration to
evoke some of the regulations put in place by this bill (Rapperport,
017). This shows that there is a significant political component to
egulation, specifically regarding how much or how little regula-
ion is appropriate. The focus, however, should not necessary be on
ore or less regulation, but rather better regulation in order to curb
anking crises or reduce systemic distress in the financial network.
This is all the more urgent as banking crises have been more
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economies with an annual probability of a crisis of approximately
4–5% (Walter, 2010).
Stability of financial institutions has attracted the attention of
many economists who have offered insight into financial system
fragility, measures of systemic risk as well the impact of regulation
on systemic risk. In addition to central banks’ stress test methodolo-
gies, Acharya et al. (2014) have proposed an alternative approach
to measuring systemic risk (SRISK) by offering an insight into how
much capital a financial institutions will need to raise during eco-
nomic crisis to bring their capital up to regulatory levels.
Comparison studies between regulatory stress tests and stress
tests that use only public market data reveal that approaches used
to weight assets by risk are not correlated with market measures
of risk. The well capitalized banks also have not fared better than
the rest of the European banks in light of the European sovereign
debt crisis of 2011 (Acharya et al., 2012, 2014; Lucas, 2014a). On the
other hand, Yan et al. (2012) find Basel III reforms to have significant
long-term positive effects on the UK economy. Lucas argues that in
addition to financial institutions, which are tightly interlinked with
the main economy, the Government is also a significant source of
systemic risk. While other factors such as lack of transparency of
government actions and the scope of government’s involvement in
financial markets can contribute to overall systemic risk buildup in
the economy, a notable systemic characteristic of the government
is its enormous size as financial conglomerate. When consider-
ing the traditional credit programs, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the
Federal Home Loan Banks, deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve
System, and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, the gov-
ernment becomes a $20 trillion financial institution (Lucas, 2014b).
The government, on the other hand, can also serve as an essen-
tial contributor to financial stability in times of crises undertaking
appropriate actions carried out swiftly. Both aspects of government,
carrying significant costs, may  contribute to rethinking the notion
that government debt is risk-free and hence reconsider sovereign
debt risk weights used to determine banks’ RWA.
To incorporate the complexity of the financial system, inter-
disciplinary approaches have been proposed. Understanding the
interconnections among financial institutions as well as interlinks
between bank networks and the main economy have been a focus
of many researchers during the past two decades starting with
Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and Furfine (2003). Using tools from net-
work science, researchers have studied the likelihood of contagion
(Upper, 2011; Glasserman and Young, 2015), developed systemic
risk measures (Battiston et al., 2012b), and analyzed specific bank-
ing systems (Van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2004; Upper and Worms,
2004). Other approaches include the study of robustness, the cost of
repair, and topological properties and their consequences for sys-
temic risk (Battiston et al., 2012a, 2016; Caldarelli, 2007; Dehmamy
et al., 2014; Elsinger et al., 2006; Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2004,
2005; Huang et al., 2011; Iori et al., 2008; Joseph et al., 2014;
Majdandzic et al., 2016; Piškorec et al., 2014; Vitali et al., 2011;
Vodenska et al., 2016, 2020).
Following a shock, the natural response of financial institu-
tions includes reducing losses by selling assets, which most likely
trade at depressed prices: due to the distress, liquidity may  dry
out and a lack of buyers reduces market value. (Huang et al., 2013;
Greenwood et al., 2015; Sakamoto and Vodenska, 2016, 2017). Pre-
vious studies have considered fire sale dynamics, in which banks
attempt to unload their assets as efficiently as possible, leading to
a downward spiral exacerbated by overlapping portfolios (Duarte
and Eisenbach, 2015; Cont and Schaanning, 2017). We  expand upon
this approach and introduce a behavioral component by including
the risk tolerance of banks, modeling financial institutions’ inclina-
tion to induce a fire sale. We  suggest that by being able to monitor
the dynamics of links in the bank network, regulators might be able
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xogenous or endogenous economic shocks, and engage in miti-
ation activities such as in Smolyak et al., 2020, to improve the
tability of the financial network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3 we
escribe the data that we use for empirical analysis. In Section 4
e  introduce the simulation model of systemic risk propagation
hrough the bipartite network of banks and assets, while in Section
 we present the results of the simulation using the European Bank-
ng Authority stress test results data. Here we highlight the effect of
nter-connectivity of the banks through shared portfolio networks.
n Section 6 we discuss the regulatory implications of our results
nd offer our concluding remarks.
. Data
We use data from the 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA)
tress test. This data offers insight into asset portfolios of Euro-
ean banks. It shows the total exposure of 90 different banks in the
ollowing seven investment categories: sovereign debt, financial
nstitutions, corporate, retail residential mortgage, retail revolving,
etail small and medium-sized enterprises (retail SME), and com-
ercial real estate (CRE). Fig. 1 shows the structure of the banks’
oldings. For each of the seven asset classes we plot the histogram
f the percentage they make up in the banks’ portfolios.
We observe that banks tend to hold large amounts of corporate
oans and assets in the residential retail sector. Sovereign debt and
oans to the financial sector play a smaller roll, while retail revolv-
ng, retail SME, and commercial real estate tend to make up the
mallest part of the banks’ portfolios. This is reflected by the means,
ndicated by dotted lines in the plot. An average bank portfolio
s comprised of roughly 14% sovereign debt, 15% loans to finan-
ial institutions, 30% corporate loans, 26% residential mortgage, 3%
evolving retail, 5% retail SME  and about 7% commercial real estate.
The data set also details which kind of country’s sovereign debt
ach bank holds. These countries include 30 European nations, the
nited States and Japan as well as a category “other”.
Fig. 2 represents a network representation of the portfolio sim-
larity of the banks. Since all banks exhibit a certain overlap in
ortfolio, we  filter the network using a method introduced by
umminello et al. (2005). Such a planar maximally filtered graph
PMFG) reduces the number of edges for information filtering and
etter graphical representation. A link, drawn in gray, between two
anks indicates that there exists a significant overlap between their
espective sovereign debt portfolios. The minimum spanning tree
ruskal (1956) of the graph is indicated by the thicker, solid edges.
e define the overlap of two  portfolios as their cosine similarity:
iven portfolios A and B with weights ai, bi distributed among asset
lasses i = 1, . . .,  N and N
i













hich is the normalized inner product of the relative weights of
ortfolio A with the relative weights of portfolio B. This product
ields a number between 0 and 1 where a value of 0 means that
ortfolio A does not contain any asset that is in portfolio B and
ice versa, and a value 1 means that both portfolio holders allocate
heir resources equally among the available assets. The size of the
odes and their color correspond to the value of all assets in the
espective bank’s portfolio and to the country or region in which it
s headquartered.
The largest banks by asset value, listed in Table 11 in the
ppendix, are positioned at the center of the minimum spanning
ree. The French bank Société Générale, which is the 11th largest
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Fig. 1. Histograms of bank holdings where the x-axis is the percentage of a bank’s portfolio an asset makes up. The dotted line indicates the mean value of the distribution.
Fig. 2. PMFG (Planar Maximally Filtered Graph) and MST  (Minimum Spanning Tree) network representation of portfolio overlap of banks considering sovereign debt. Banks
from  different countries and regions are color-coded. British and Irish banks (bright red), French banks (blue), banks from the Benelux countries (orange), German banks










by weighting the exposure to an asset by an estimate of their risk-
iness. Until 2013 Basel III has required banks to maintain a tier 1
capital ratio of at least 4.5 percent at all times. In line with the phase-Scandinavian banks (light blue). The size of the node represents the value of all as
of  the network. We  observe that banks from the same country cluster, indicating t
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
bank, has the most connections to non-domestic banks (13). The
French bank BNP Paribas (2nd largest), the Belgian bank Dexia (17th
largest), and the British bank HSBC (largest bank in the data set)
follow in second place with 10 connections to banks from other
countries. We  can roughly separate the banks into two  groups. On
the one hand we have around 20 of the largest banks which show
significant portfolio overlap with banks from other countries, indi-
cating a broad and international portfolio of sovereign debt. On the
other hand we find the remaining banks sharing a larger overlap
with banks from their own country or neighboring countries. For
example, sovereign debt holdings by Danish banks tend to be more
similar to sovereign debt holdings of other Scandinavian banks as
compared to the portfolios of banks from other European coun-
tries. These home and regional biases may  be due to regulatory
4
bank holds as a proxy for the size of the bank. The largest banks are at the center
eir portfolios are similar due to home and regional bias. (For interpretation of the
rticle.)
equirements such as Basel II, which have allowed to favor domestic
overeign debt,1 and probably reflect the focus of a bank’s busi-
ess operations. We  use this insight later to approximate the bank
oldings in other asset classes.
The EBA data also details the tier 1 capital ratios of banks which is
efined as the ratio of tier 1 equity and the sum of the risk-weighted
ssets of a bank. The risk-weighted assets of a bank are calculated1 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128b.pdf.
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Fig. 4. Spreading parameter Q (Ds) where Ds is the CDS spread in basis points for
a  given sovereign debt s. The function Q (Ds) = 1 − 2−Ds/100 is selected such that its






















Fig. 3. Bipartite network of the banks  ̌ and sovereign debts s.
in arrangements of the Basel III framework,2 the requirements are
currently higher than that; however we recognize that we  need to
compare the situation of the banks in our data set with the regu-
lations at the time. The 2011 EBA report includes two  banks that
have a capital of less than 4.5 percent already, however, which we
have to remember in the analysis of the results of our simulations.
These banks are the Allied Irish Banks (tier 1 capital ratio of 3.7%)
and the Spanish Caja de Ahorros (3.8%). Hypo Real Estate exhibits
the largest value among all banks, with a tier 1 capital ratio of 28.4
percent. The mean and median capital ratio of the banks in the data
set are 9.3 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively.
4. Simulation model
While the EBA data details the origin of sovereign debts in a
bank’s portfolio, it does not identify the origin of other assets, that is,
financial institutions, corporate, retail residential mortgage, retail
revolving, retail SME, and commercial real estate. We  make the
assumption that the distribution of sovereign debts of a given bank
is a good proxy for the entire portfolio of that bank. In other words, if
half of a given bank’s sovereign debt exposure comes from German
bonds, we assume that also half of its exposure to financial insti-
tutions, corporate, etc., comes from Germany. The static balance
sheet and distribution of bank portfolio assumptions are based on
the bank balance sheet characteristics, where the credit exposures
that banks have on one hand (the asset side) and the financing, i.e.,
short and long term debt on the other (the liability side) of the bal-
ance sheet are usually quite stable over extended periods of time.
Bank leverage (or the equity level of the bank) is also quite invariant
and it is regulated by international regulatory frameworks such as
Basel III.
This allows us to construct a complete bipartite network, in
which banks and assets interact back and forth, as illustrated for
the case of sovereign debts in Fig. 3. Let us first define variables on
the bank layer and the asset layer, and then the risk propagation
procedure.
4.1. Modelling a bank’s exposures
A bank  ̌ ∈ [1,  2, 3, . . .,  NB(= 90)] is invested into different
asset subcategories a ∈ [1,  . . .,  NA(= 7)] from different countries
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Aˇ,NA,1 Aˇ,NA,NSD︸ ︷︷  ︸
Countries
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭








alue of 0.5. A CDS spread of 0 corresponds to a Q value of 0, and as the CDS  spread
rows, Q approaches 1. Note the similarity of the function Q (Ds) with the default
robability derived from a CDS spread for some maturity and recovery rate.



















ˇ,s The first row of the matrix Aˇ , contain the exposure to all sovereign







ˇ Sum of risk-weighted assets (RWA).
ˇ tier 1 capital.
ˇ tier 1 capital ratio, Rˇ = Cˇ/Wˇ .
The RWA  of a bank  ̌ in the data are calculated according to
asel III. We instead make use of a weighted sum as our definition
f RWA:














here rs denotes the risk factor (weight) of the SD s and wa,s for
 ≥ 2 are the risk factors of other assets from different countries.
ash is an important part of any bank’s assets. However, it presents
o risk and is therefore absent in this summation. The weights for
he RWA  are estimated using an optimization procedure against the
eported aggregated holdings of risk-weighted assets. While debt
ith longer maturity poses less immediate risk, in this study we
se a simple sum of all holdings, regardless of their maturity.
.2. Modeling sovereign debts and other assets
The EBA data details the country of origin of the sovereign debt.
e assign the following variables for sovereign debt s, where s is
gain the indicator for the country of origin:
s Total exposure, owned by all the banks in our database, Ss = NBˇ=1Sˇ,s .
s Risk factor, rs = w1,s . Before shock, r1 = r2 = · · · = r
s Yearly average of the CDS spread.
(Ds) Spreading Parameter; Q (Ds) = 1 − 2−Ds/100, so that Q (0) = 0,
Q (100) = 0.5, as shown in Fig. 4.
















































I. Vodenska, H. Aoyama, A.P. Becker et al. 
Aa,s Total exposure to all assets from asset category a from country s,






wa,s Risk factor. Before shock, wa,1 = wa,2 = · · · = wa
Qa Spreading Parameter for a given asset class; constant across all
countries.
As pointed out before, the data regarding the exposure to other
asset classes than sovereign debt come in aggregate form. In other











debt holdings. This is an assumption which we find supported by
the regional bias in the sovereign debt holdings we  discovered
through a network analysis in Fig. 2. The regional bias suggests
a tendency of banks to be active mostly in domestic and familiar
markets. Furthermore we posit that a portfolio of one asset class
in one country exhibits similar risk as a portfolio of the same asset
class in another country, e.g. corporate lending in Italy is similar
to corporate lending in Spain, while lending across different asset
classes has a different risk profile.
4.3. Iteration model
We  run simulations for different crisis scenarios. One, we shock
the sovereign debts of a given country by increasing their risk fac-
tors. The only interaction occurs between banks and sovereign
debts; the other asset categories are unaffected. Two, we  shock
any sector of a given country by increasing its risk factor, and we
include the possibility of spillover to other asset classes. The sector
suffering the initial shock can be any of the seven asset categories,
from sovereign debt to commercial real estate. Three, we  shock the
banks in a given country by decreasing their capital by a certain
percentage.
4.3.1. Shocking sovereign debts
We  simulate a crisis scenario which starts with sovereign debts.
We consider ten different shock origins:
(1) GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain)
(2) Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia)








The simulation process is as follows: Upon initialization, an SD
or a set of SDs from the countries of origin above has their risk factor
increased at t = 0.
1. At t = 1, these shocks on SDs are propagated to the banks who
own those SDs. As a result of the increased risk factors, the RWA
of the affected banks is increased and their tier 1 capital ratio
decreased.
2. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated back to SDs.
A bank that is affected by the shock in the previous step might be
forced to take action, putting pressure on the SDs in its portfolio.
The risk factors of all SDs owned by affected banks are therefore
increased, depending on the decrease in the tier 1 capital ratio
of those banks.
3. At t = 3, shocks on SDs are propagated to banks, in a manner
much like the step t = 1. The propagation continues back and
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The capital Cˇ of bank  ̌ remains constant throughout the sim-
lation run. Therefore the change tier 1 capital ratio is entirely
etermined by the change in the RWA.
As described above, we model the risk propagation from the
anks to the SD s (at t = 2, 4, 6, . . .)  through the increase in risk fac-
ors. Each SD s contributes to the risk-weighted assets WSD
ˇ
of bank
, and thus each bank holding an affected SD will see an increase
n their RWA  proportional to its exposure to this SD. The expo-
ures from other sectors also contribute to the risk-weighted assets
other
ˇ
of each bank. These, however, will remain unchanged:
s(t + 1) = rs(t)/s(t), (3)
a,s(t + 1) = wa,s(t), (4)
here













ith no changes on the bank side, that is, in Cˇ. The value for the
isk weights is capped at rmax = 2.
P(x) is a function which allows us to model the bank response
o distress. The argument x is the fraction of capital tier 1 ratio left
fter a shock with respect to the tier 1 capital ratio in the previous
ime step; accordingly 1 − x is the relative loss in one time step. Our
nalysis considers two broad cases: banks that are risk averse and
eact to a deterioration of their tier 1 capital ratio accordingly on
ne hand, and banks that are risk neutral on the other.
Risk attitudes correspond to different curvatures of the util-
ty function. For payoffs, a concave utility function describes the
isk aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman,
985); for losses, the utility function of a risk averse agent therefore
s convex. Functions of the form Max
[
1 − (1 − x)˛, 0
]
are convex,
inear, or concave on the interval 0 to 1 depending on the choice of
. For simplicity, we  consider a linear approximation,
˛(x) = Max [1 −  ̨ (1 − x), 0] (6)
or 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 as the possible bank response functions to a decrease
n tier 1 capital ratio. In this case Eq. (5) simplifies to










n our analysis we focus on the cases  ̨ = 1 which we  call the lin-
ar case (risk neutral attitude) and  ̨ = 2 which we call the steep
ase (risk averse attitude) as shown in Fig. 5. The linear case implies
hat a bank will find a 20% drop in tier 1 capital ratio twice as bad
s a 10% drop in tier 1 capital ratio. In the steep case, losses would
e perceived much more negatively, modeling a larger sensitivity
o losses. Therefore the steep function causes a more drastic effect
iven the same decrease in tier 1 capital ratio. Alternatively, the
mpact of the parameter  ̨ can be interpreted as follows:  ̨ deter-
ines for which value x the function P(x) reaches the minimum
alue of zero, the worst case scenario. The larger ˛, the smaller the
ecline in tier 1 capital ratio that corresponds to the worst case
cenario.
Eqs. (5) and (7) incorporate the CDS spread in basis points Ds.
s a bank suffers from an increase in their RWA  and a decrease in
ier 1 capital ratio, it is reasonable to assume that this will affect
ebts of different quality differently. The higher the spread is for a
overeign debt, the more its risk weight will increase for the next
imulation step. If the SD has a low spreading parameter, it will
ot be very affected by the banks’ financial condition. With this, we
odel that Greek debt, for example, will deteriorate more given





































starts; this may  be an asset class or the equity of a bank. WhenFig. 5. The reduction factor P(x) in Eq. (5). The dotted curve shows the linear case,
and the solid curve shows the steep case.
additional market stress than German debt. We  refer to Q (Ds) as
the spreading parameter.
The change in risk factors in Eq. (4) changes the RWA  as follows:




Wotherˇ (t + 1) = Wotherˇ (t). (9)
4.3.2. Shocking other asset categories
In this crisis scenario, an asset category is being shocked, and
there will be spill-over to other asset categories. The simulation
process can then be described as follows. We  initialize an asset
categories in a country or a set of countries to have its risk factor
increased at t = 0. We  consider the same 10 scenarios as in the
previous case.
1. At t = 1, these shocks on assets are propagated to the banks who
own those assets. As a result of the increased risk factors, the
RWA  of the affected banks is increased and their tier 1 capital
ratio decreased.
2. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated back to assets.
A bank that is affected by the shock in the previous step might
be forced to take action, putting pressure on all their assets in
its portfolio. We  emulate this by increasing the risk factors of
the assets that the affected bank holds, depending on how many
of these assets the bank holds and how much its tier 1 capital
ratio has decreased. Unlike in the previous scenario where the
increase in risk factor was limited to sovereign debts, that is, the
asset class in which the shock started, in this scenario the risk
weights of all assets of affected banks will increase.
3. At t = 3, the increased risk factors across all asset classes lead to a
new, higher value for the risk-weighted assets of the banks. Just
like in step t = 1, this causes a further decrease in tier 1 capital
ratio. The propagation continues back and forth until the system
saturates.
The capital Cˇ of bank  ̌ remains constant throughout the simula-
tion run.
As pointed out before, it is likely that a stress to a bank’s portfolio
originating from some of its exposures will lead to adjustments
across all asset classes. In that case the shock propagation will not
only change the risk factors for sovereign debts, but it will also
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llow a maximum value of 2 for the risk weights. Extending the
hock propagation, we  rewrite Eq. (4) as follows:
rs(t + 1) = rs(t)/s(t),
wa,s(t + 1) = wa,s(t)/a(t),
(10)
here a(t) is extended to the case of non-SDs:










Like its counterpart for sovereign debts, the shock parameter
ill depend on the other asset classes through the asset-specific
oldings of a bank Aˇ,a and the equivalent of a spreading parame-
er, Qa. Recall that we have chosen to set Qa to be the same for all
ountries.
In the same way as Q (Ds) models the susceptibility of sovereign
ebt s to deteriorating market conditions, Qa describes how
trongly asset class a is affected by a reduction in tier 1 Capital
f banks exposed to it. If we  set Qa = 0, we recover Eq. (4) and we
rohibit any spillover into other asset classes. For any other value
 < Qa ≤ 1, banks affected by an initial shock in the SD sector will
ause an increase in risk factor for other asset classes, proportion-
lly to their exposures.
.3.3. Shocking the capital of banks
Previously we have kept the capital Cˇ of all banks constant.
owever, we  can well imagine a scenario in which a shock to a
ank or to a couple of banks stems from a sudden drop in equity.
uch a sudden drop would leave a bank potentially over-leveraged,
hat is, their tier 1 capital ratio becomes too small. Our  model allows
s to study the effect of such a shock as well. We  do this as follows,
onsidering the same 10 scenarios as in the previous case.
. At t = 1, the capital of a bank or a group of banks is reduced by
a certain percentage. As a result of that, their tier 1 capital ratio
decreases.
. At t = 2, those shocks on the banks are propagated to assets, like
in the previous scenarios, the only difference being that all assets
start out with their original risk weights. The risk weights of all
assets that are held by affected banks will increase.
. At t = 3, the increased risk factors across all asset classes lead
to a new, higher value for the risk-weighted assets for all banks
holding them. In this step, the crisis originating in a subset of
banks spreads to other banks. Again this propagation continues
back and forth until the system saturates.
he iteration process follows the same dynamics as in the scenarios
n which we shocked sovereign debt and other asset classes, using
qs. (10) and (11).
. Simulation results
Using our model, we  obtain simulation results for the three
ifferent scenarios described in the previous section, (a) shock-
ng sovereign debt, (b) shocking any asset category allowing for
pillover, and (c) shocking bank capital. We  characterize the initial
hock, market conditions, and the behavior of market participants
y two parameters and a response function. As the shock origin we
onsider the ten scenarios as described in Section 4.3. The shocked
ector refers to the part of the financial network in which the shockhocking assets, we increase their risk weights, increasing the risk-
eighted assets and thus reducing banks’ tier 1 capital ratio. The
hock size ranges from increasing the risk weights by a factor of one-
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Fig. 6. Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the retail residential sector in GIIPS countries, given different bank response functions and both a small shock size and

















Fig. 7. Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the retail residential sector i
spreading parameter.
and-a-half to four.3 We  perturb the banks by simulating a sudden
decrease of their equity and thus reducing the tier 1 capital ratio;
this shock size ranges from a reduction by 10 to 90 percent. The
spreading parameter describes the market conditions for sovereign
debt Qs and for other asset classes Qa. The spreading parameter Qs
for the sovereign debt is a function of the CDS spread as shown in
Fig. 4. The spreading parameters for the other asset classes is a free
parameter where for simplicity we set Q1 = Q2 = · · · = Qa for all
asset classes. The bank response function P(x) describes the behav-
ior of market participants. We  distinguish between the linear and
the steep bank response function P(x) as put forth in Eq. (6).
5.1. Shocking sovereign debt only
The first scenario in our simulation considers a shock to
sovereign debt without any spillover to the other asset classes.
Sovereign debt usually makes up a small fraction of a bank’s assets,
with exposure of most banks of about one tenth of the total as
shown in Fig. 1 in the data section.
If we use risk weights (rs) for sovereign debt at the lower end of
the range described in Table 1, the impact of sovereign debt on a
bank’s risk-weighted assets becomes all but negligible. Therefore,
even a major shock in any of the ten different shock origins will not
have any significant effect on banks’ risk-weighted assets for ini-
tial risk weights rs = 0.002. In turn, the tier 1 capital ratio decrease
is so minor that any shock propagation is stalled right away. This
finding holds for both the linear and the steep bank response func-
tion. Therefore, the value we initially assume for the risk weights
rs becomes crucial.
3 Recall that we limit the magnitude of a risk weight to wmax = 2, which shall not







S countries, given different bank response functions and a large size and a small
If we  use the risk weights at the upper end of the range in Table 1,
s = 0.1, a major shock such as a fourfold increase in those risk
eights for an affected country will have a measurable impact on
anks holding a large chunk of this sovereign debt. However, the
hock propagation stalls after at most a couple of steps for both
he linear and the steep bank response function. If we consider a
hock originating in a country or region with very low sovereign
ebt CDS spread, such as Germany or the Benelux countries, the
ncrease in risk weights diminishes already in the step right after
he initial shock. Considering the GIIPS countries, which exhibit the
argest CDS spreads in our data set, the shock propagates for two
teps; however it does not noticeably impact banks any more than
he original shock.
.2. Allowing for spillover between asset classes
We  have observed that shocks to sovereign debt alone do not
ecome systemic events within the framework of our model. This
s mainly due to three reasons:
(i) Many banks hold only a low amount of sovereign debt.
(ii) The risks weights of sovereign debt are very low, signifying that
it is considered practically riskless. The European sovereign
debt crisis at least raises doubts regarding the risk-free nature
of sovereign debt.
iii) We  do not consider a spillover between asset classes, that is,
a shock to sovereign debt will remain contained within the
sovereign debt sector.e therefore proceed to analyze the results when we include other
sset classes with their larger risk weights as the source of shocks
s well as when we allow for a spillover from one asset class to
nother, according to Eqs. (5) and (11).
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Table  1
Weighted average model for risk-weighted assets. The values for the exposure to different asset classes are for bank AT001. We present an example calculation for risk
weights at the lower end of the range determined by our optimization procedure.
a Item wa range Aa wa waAa
1 Sovereign Debt [0.002, 0.1] 27,267 0.002 55
2  Financial institutions [0.5, 1.0] 25,044 0.5 12,522
3  Corporate [0.5, 1.3] 61,237 0.5 42,866
4  Retail: Residential Mortgages [0.5, 0.8] 36,663 0.5 14,665
5  Revolving [0.8, 1.2] 23,153 0.8 18,522












































7  Commercial real estate
Total  RWA  W ,  according to Eq. (2) 
We  take 10 of the 90 banks as a sample to illustrate the dynamics
and the outcome of a shock from various origins. The banks are Erste
Bank Group (AT001), Deutsche Bank (DE017), Banco de Sabadell
(ES065), Credit Agricole (FR014), Barclays (GB090), National Bank
of Greece (GR031), Bank of Ireland (IE038), Unicredit (IT041), ING
Bank (NL047), and Banco Comercial Portugues (PT054). This selec-
tion aims to represent a good cross section of all European banks
and to demonstrate one or more banks very vulnerable to the sce-
narios we consider. For example, we can expect Deutsche Bank
to be initially more strongly effected by a crisis that originates in
Germany, scenario (7).
The first scenario we consider is a shock which originates in the
GIIPS countries, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Figs. 6–8
show the dynamics for the banks given an increase of the risk
weights associated with residential mortgages from these coun-
tries. For most banks, retail residential mortgages are the most
important or second most important asset class by exposure. We
present results for different shock sizes, spreading parameters, and
bank response function. If we consider a spreading parameter of
Qa = 0.3, the system is stable for both a linear and a steep bank
response function, as Fig. 6 indicates As a matter of fact, a four-
fold increase of the risk weights does not cause a systemic event
either, see Fig. 7. The sudden large increase in risk weights, how-
ever, causes a tremendous decline in the tier 1 capital ratio for banks
heavily involved in mortgages in this region. Banks from other than
GIIPS countries see an obvious downtick in their tier 1 capital ratios
as well. As a consequence, a couple of banks fall below the Basel III
threshold.
If we increase the spreading parameter to Qa = 0.6 while still
considering a linear bank response function, the system remains in
the stable regime, and the initial shock does not cause a spillover. If
we consider a spreading parameter of Qa = 0.6 and assume a steep
bank response function, however, the system exhibits instability.
This can be seen in Fig. 8, and it holds true for any shock size. While
an increase of risk weights increase of wa → 4wa could not cause
a systemic event for a lower spreading parameter or a linear bank
response function, even the smallest increase of wa will trigger a
systemic event if the spreading parameter is sufficiently large and
we use the steep bank response function. As an example, Fig. 8
shows how wa → 1.5wa causes all banks to eventually fall below
the Basel III threshold in our simulations.
Fig. 8 has demonstrated that even small shocks may  eventu-
ally cause a systemic event, given an adverse set of parameters.
While we concluded that sovereign debt in isolation cannot trig-
ger a systemic event, we revisit this problem, now allowing for
spillover to other asset classes. Specifically, we focus on the con-
ditions that have facilitated a systemic event after an initial shock
to residential mortgages. Fig. 9 shows the dynamics for the banks
given an increase of risk weights for sovereign debt from GIIPS
countries from 0.002 to 0.008. We  use a spreading parameter of
Qa = 0.6 and the steep bank response function. While the slope of
the tier 1 capital ratio decline is much less than in Fig. 8 and there-
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he dynamics become equivalent. Indeed, the final tier 1 capital val-
es for the banks are very similar for both cases, not shown in the
gure.
Our observations for these two  cases hold for a shock origin in
ther asset classes from the GIIPS countries as well. In absence of
 systemic event, the final tier 1 capital ratio of a bank can be well
pproximated by the impact of the initial shock on its tier 1 capital
atio. In other words, the exposure to a specific asset class from a
pecific country determines the magnitude of tier 1 capital losses.
f we observe a systemic event, however, banks start deteriorating
niformly as the initial shock has spread to all asset classes. In this
ase, the initial exposure to a specific asset class from a specific
ountry influences only the initial rate of decline, but it does not
ffect the outcome.
Table 2 indicates how many banks would be distressed in the
en scenarios we have proposed. Since only the steep bank response
unction and a high enough spreading parameter can trigger a sys-
emic event, we consider shocks to all seven sectors given Psteep(x)
nd Qa = 0.6. We  report how many banks fall below the Basel III
hreshold after 50 time steps and after 100 time steps. As we can
ee by comparing Figs. 8 and 9, shocks to different sectors and with
ifferent shock sizes permeate the system at different speeds.
In many cases, two  thirds or more of the 90 banks can be con-
idered distressed in our simulation after 100 time steps. This is
rue regardless of shock origin and the asset class which is ini-
ially shocked. The largest average distress across all asset classes
an be found when shocking the GIIPS countries; 65.6 percent of
ll banks have fallen below the Basel III threshold after 100 time
teps. Even after only 50 time steps, shocks to assets from the GIIPS
ountry have large destructive capacity, distressing nearly half of
ll banks. A shock to assets from Spain leads to the second largest
umber of distressed banks across all sectors, with 64.9 percent of
ll banks having a tier 1 capital ratio of less than 4.5% after 100
ime steps. As compared to a shock to the GIIPS countries of which
pain is a part, a shock to assets from Spain tends to spread more
lowly, leaving only about a quarter of banks distressed after 50
ime steps. We  observe that, while most shocks have large nega-
ive impacts, a shock to corporate loans damages the system very
uickly. In contrast, shocks to retail SME  loans or commercial real
state tend to spread out more slowly, allowing for more time to
ntervene. We  report these results in more detail in the appendix
n Table 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19.
.3. Shocking the equity of banks
So far we have only shocked the risk-weighted assets of the
anks. Subsequently, we simulate the reduction of equity in a sub-
et of banks. Since in this study we  analyze the European banking
ystem, we  focus on scenarios (1) through (8). We  report both the
verage loss in tier 1 capital ratio as well as the number of banks
hich fall below the Basel III threshold of 4.5 percent. The results
re presented in Tables 3–10.
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Fig. 8. Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to the retail residential sector in GIIPS countries, given different bank response functions and a small shock size and a
larger spreading parameter.
Fig. 9. Tier 1 capital ratios over time after a shock to sovereign debt in GIIPS countries, given different bank response functions and spreading parameters. Note that only the
first  100 time steps of the simulation are shown, and after roughly 100 time steps more the system reaches a stationary state like in Fig. 8.
Table 2
Number of banks that would fall below the Basel III threshold of 4.5% tier 1 capital ratio given a shock to different sectors in each of our ten scenarios. We list the number
of  distressed banks after 50 simulation time steps (D50) and after 100 simulation time steps (D100). The initial shock is a sudden increase of the risk weights of the shocked
sector  of a particular country or region by 50%, causing an increase of the risk-weighted assets of banks. The numbers include the two banks which are below the threshold
originally.
Sector Financial Corporate Ret. Resid. Ret. Rev. Ret. SME  Comm. RE Average
Origin D50 D100 D50 D100 D50 D100 D50 D100 D50 D100 D50 D100 D50 D100
(1) GIIPS 72 77 71 72 78 81 12 75 48 76 55 76 48.6 65.6
(2)  EE 5 75 35 76 5 74 3 27 4 56 5 67 8.4 53.9
(3)  Benelux 7 75 57 76 19 76 3 8 5 69 5 69 14.0 53.6
(4)  Greece 3 56 15 76 4 59 3 15 3 18 3 48 4.7 39.1
(5)  Italy 27 77 69 75 20 76 3 20 16 76 17 76 22.0 57.4
(6)  France 8 76 68 75 22 76 3 44 8 75 5 71 16.6 59.9
(7)  Germany 72 77 71 75 21 78 3 22 5 69 25 76 28.4 57.0
(8)  Spain 19 78 68 75 60 80 5 69 12 75 12 75 25.7 64.9
(9)  US 12 77 69 75 25 76 5 69 4 64 10 75 18.3 62.6
(10)  Japan 3 62 22 76 5 69 3 15 3 53 3 55 5.6 47.6
Average 22.9 73.1 54.5 75.1 25.9 74.5 4.4 36.4 11.0 63.1 14.1 68.8 19.3 56.1
Table 3
Effect of an equity shock that originates in the GIIPS countries. There are a total of 43 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by
50%.  We  show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in GIIPS countries (Loss GIIPS) as
well  as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than GIIPS countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their
tier  1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the GIIPS countries (D100
GIIPS) and for other than GIIPS countries (D100 Other).




lin 12.1 24.0 1.2 5 5 0
steep 16.1 29.5 3.8 11 10 1
0.9
lin  31.9 46.9 18.2 27 25 2
steep 72.0 75.2 69.1 88 42 46
50%
0.3
lin  28.4 56.1 3.0 35 34 1
steep 33.7 61.8 7.9 38 37 1
0.9
lin  57.6 79.4 37.7 47 42 5
steep 76.4 84.5 69.1 89 43 46
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Table  4
Effect of an equity shock that originates in the Eastern European countries. There are a total of 4 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by
20%  and by 50%. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Eastern Europe (Loss
EE)  as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Eastern European countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test
by  having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We  again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for
the  Eastern Europe (D100 EE) and for other than Eastern European countries (D100 Other).





lin 1.0 21.2 0.0 3 1 2
steep 1.1 22.5 0.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin  1.4 24.8 0.3 3 1 2
steep 69.3 74.3 69.1 87 4 83
50%
0.3
lin  2.4 52.0 0.0 4 2 2
steep 2.5 53.2 0.1 4 2 2
0.9
lin  3.4 57.7 0.9 4 2 2
steep 69.7 84.0 69.1 87 4 83
Table 5
Effect of an equity shock that originates in the Benelux countries. There are a total of 7 banks from these countries. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by
50%.  We  show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Benelux countries (Loss Benelux)
as  well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Benelux countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having
their  tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We  again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for the Benelux
countries (D100 Benelux) and for other than Benelux countries (D100 Other).




lin 2.2 21.8 0.6 2 0 2
steep 3.5 24.1 1.8 3 0 3
0.9
lin  10.1 31.4 8.3 3 0 3
steep 69.5 77.5 68.8 87 7 80
50%
0.3
lin  5.4 52.8 1.4 3 1 2
steep 7.8 55.3 3.8 6 3 3
0.9
lin  24.3 67.3 20.7 14 7 7
steep 70.1 85.9 68.8 87 7 80
Table 6
Effect of an equity shock that originates in Greece. There are a total of 6 banks in Greece. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We  show the average
loss  in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Greece (Loss Greece) as well as the average loss in tier 1
capital ratio for banks in other than Greece (Loss Other). We  also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent:
We  again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Greece (D100 Greece) and for other than Greece (D100 Other).




lin 1.6 22.5 0.1 2 0 2
steep 2.0 25.3 0.3 2 0 2
0.9
lin  3.2 31.2 1.2 3 1 2
steep 69.4 75.0 69.0 88 6 82
50%
0.3
lin  3.8 53.8 0.2 5 3 2
steep 4.3 56.8 0.6 5 3 2
0.9
lin  7.6 67.1 3.4 8 5 3
steep 70.1 84.4 69.0 88 6 82
Table 7
Effect of an equity shock that originates in Italy. There are a total of 6 banks in Italy. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We  show the average loss
in  tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Italy (Loss Italy) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio
for  banks in other than Italy (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We again count
the  total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Italy (D100 Italy) and for other than Italy (D100 Other).




lin 1.6 22.7 0.4 4 2 2
steep 2.7 26.0 1.4 4 2 2
0.9
lin  8.3 34.9 6.8 6 3 3
steep 69.4 72.9 69.2 87 5 82
0.3








lin  20.9 
steep 70.0 
It comes as no surprise that a shock to banks in the GIIPS coun-
tries would have the largest effect on the entire system. Almost half
of the banks in our data set are based in one of these five countries,
and therefore the size of the initial shock would be quite significant.
Furthermore, we recognize that a linear bank response function
effectively stops spillover of the crisis. For example, in scenario (i),
even given the largest shock size of 50 percent and a large spread-




1157.7 2.9 8 5 3
71.7 18.0 10 5 5
83.1 69.2 87 5 82
ould fall below the Basel III requirements. The importance of the
preading parameter is again amplified in case of the steep response
unction: If the spreading parameter is large and we  assume a steep
ank response function, the initial shock size matters very little.
lmost all banks would fall below the Basel III tier 1 capital ratio
hreshold given these parameters, regardless of where the shock
riginated.
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Table  8
Effect of an equity shock that originates in France. There are a total of 4 banks in France. We  simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We show the average
loss  in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in France (Loss France) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital
ratio  for banks in other than France (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We
again  count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for France (D100 France) and for other than France (D100 Other).




lin 1.7 21.7 0.8 2 0 2
steep 3.4 24.1 2.4 3 0 3
0.9
lin  12.0 32.8 11.0 4 0 4
steep 69.3 74.5 69.1 87 4 83
50%
0.3
lin  4.2 52.6 1.9 6 4 2
steep 7.3 55.3 5.0 7 4 3
0.9
lin  28.3 68.6 26.4 12 4 8
steep 69.7 84.0 69.1 87 4 83
Table 9
Effect of an equity shock that originates in Germany. There are a total of 12 banks in Germany. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We show the
average  loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Germany (Loss Germany) as well as the average loss
in  tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Germany (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below
4.5  percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Germany (D100 Germany) and for other than
Germany (D100 Other).




lin 3.6 22.5 0.6 3 1 2
steep 5.3 25.8 2.1 3 1 2
0.9
lin  13.6 35.8 10.2 3 1 2
steep 69.9 75.2 69.0 87 11 76
50%
0.3
lin  8.6 53.9 1.6 8 6 2
steep 11.5 57.4 4.4 9 7 2
0.9
lin  31.8 72.8 25.5 18 11 7
steep 71.1 84.5 69.0 87 11 76
Table 10
Effect of an equity shock that originates in Spain. There are a total of 25 banks in Spain. We simulate a sudden drop of bank equity by 20% and by 50%. We show the average
loss  in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Spain (Loss Spain) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital
ratio  for banks in other than Spain (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We again
count  the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Spain (D100 Spain) and for other than Spain (D100 Other).




lin 7.0 24.3 0.4 3 2 1
steep 9.3 30.0 1.4 7 6 1
0.9
lin  18.8 45.7 8.4 17 15 2
steep 70.7 75.4 68.9 87 24 63
50%
0.3
lin 16.4 56.7 0.9 21 20 1
steep 19.5 62.5 3.0 23 21 2
0.9
lin  37.4 80.2 21.0 29 24 5
steep 73.3 84.6 68.9 88 25 63
Fig. 10. Evolution of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank (DE017) for a shock to various sectors in Germany, given a linear response function and a steep response function.
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Fig. 11. Evolution of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank (DE017) for a shock t
steep  response function.
In order to compare the dynamics of a shock to a bank’s equity,
that is, a direct shock, to the dynamics after an indirect shock
through an asset class, we consider in more detail the outcomes
for Deutsche Bank (DE017) as an example. Fig. 10 illustrates the
development of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank for a shock
to asset classes from Germany as well as the equity of all German
banks. We  initialize the shock by an increase of risk weights of the
shocked asset class by 50 percent or decreasing the equity of Ger-
man  banks by 20 percent, respectively. We  let the simulation run
until a stationary state is reached; for better comparability we only
show the results of the first 100 time steps, though.
We confirm that the linear response triggers now systemic event
and we focus on the results for the steep response function. A shock
to the equity of all German banks has both the largest initial impact
on Deutsche Bank and leads to the lowest tier 1 capital ratio at the
end of the simulation. In fact, the final tier 1 capital ratio is about
one fifth lower than for shock to other asset classes. A shock to
corporate loans or financial loans from Germany causes the fastest
deterioration of the tier 1 capital ratio of Deutsche Bank, as this bank
is strongly invested in these two asset classes. Shocks to other asset
classes lead to slightly different dynamics: While the tier 1 capital
ratio in the cases of initial shocks to corporate and financial loans is
practically linear, a shock to other asset classes starts slowly, with a
low downward slope, but picks up pace as time goes by. Apparently,
an initial shock in these asset classes builds up slowly and it is
not until other, more important asset classes to the bank become
affected that the propagation causes bigger losses. Interestingly, for
this reason, the shock that originates in the corporate loan sector
and causes a tier 1 capital ratio decline the fastest leaves the bank at
a slightly higher tier 1 capital ratio at the end of the simulation. The
shock spreads at such a high rate that the maximum risk weight
of wa = 2 is achieved very quickly for this asset class, stalling the
propagation before “infecting” other asset classes. It needs to be
pointed out, though, that this difference is minor, and in all cases
Deutsche Bank falls below the Basel III threshold in our simulations.
In Fig. 10, we only consider shocks that originate in Germany,
affecting German assets and German banks’ equity initially. Fig. 11
focusses on the asset class of corporate loans, which we have identi-
fied as the shock affecting the bank the fastest, and we  differentiate
now by origin of shock. The shock size and spreading parameter
are the same as in the previous discussion. Since we have used the
sovereign debt holdings of Deutsche Bank to approximate its hold-
ings in other classes, Fig. 11 is an approximation to how affected





13orate loans in various countries or regions, given a linear response function and a
hock to spread throughout the market. Again, we only observe a
ecrease in tier 1 capital ratio through the initial shock using the
inear bank response function, and we observe a systemic event
sing the steep bank response function. As we have seen before,
 shock to assets from GIIPS countries leads to the fastest decline
n tier 1 capital ratio for Deutsche Bank, which reflects the size of
he original shock, followed by a shock to German assets which
eflects the domestic bias of Deutsche Bank. Interestingly, a shock
o US exhibits a very quick decline in tier 1 capital ratio as well. This
s not too surprising however, because we would expect an global
layer like Deutsche Bank to be very active on the US market. It
akes the longest time for shocks from Greece (due to the compa-
ably low amount of Greek assets on the market), Japan and Eastern
urope (due to the limited amount of holdings in these regions) to
ut Deutsche Bank below the Basel III threshold. However, as before
he initial shocks all converge to roughly the same final value of tier
 capital ratio for Deutsche Bank.
.4. Phase space analysis
In our exploration of specific parameters, we have recognized
hat there appears to be a phase transition for the steep bank
esponse function, depending on the value for the spreading param-
ter. In the following we  expand our analysis to a wide range of
arameters for both, a linear and a steep response function. We
se a shock originating in the Benelux countries as an example to
iscuss the outcome for the banks in our sample given. We choose
he Benelux countries because unlike a shock to the GIIPS countries
hich involves a very large amount of assets and banks or to East-
rn Europe, for example, which involves much fewer assets and
anks, this scenario corresponds to a mid-sized shock with respect
o assets and number of initially affected banks. We  want to point
ut that the following analysis and its findings are applicable to
hocks from different origins.
Fig. 12 show the phase diagrams for a shock originating in the
enelux countries, using a linear bank response function. Each of
he subplots captures a different crisis origin and explores the out-
ome for a wide range of parameters of shock size and spreading.
e consider a crisis onset due to a sudden loss in tier 1 equity
or all banks in the Benelux countries as well as crisis onsets due
o a sudden increase in risk weights for assets from a given asset
lass in Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. We  allow the
hock between banks and assets to propagate back and forth for
00 time steps, that is, 100 propagations from assets to banks and














Fig. 12. Phase space for different scenarios given a linear bank response function: W
of  values for the spreading parameter. We observe no amplification of shocks. The s
purple  (very large shock). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
100 propagations back from banks to assets. On the y-axis we show
the average decrease in tier 1 capital ratio of all banks. On the x-
axis we show the sector spread, that is, the value of the parameter
Qa, which indicates how affected an asset from a given asset class
is when banks holding it experience distress. For the presentation
of these results, we set Q2 = . . . = Qa for all asset classes except
the sovereign debt where we use the idiosyncratic values from the
CDS swaps. Indicated by colors is the size of the original shock. We
consider the following range of shock sizes: In the case of banks,
we reduce the capital by 10 to 90 percent. In the case of the other
assets, the shock is initiated by an increase of risk weights by 50
percent up to a fourfold increase.
Our main observation in Fig. 12 is that, as expected, the impact





14nsider a variety of initial shock sizes to banks and asset classes as well as a variety
the initial shock is indicated by the color, where from yellow (small shock) to dark
d, the reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
rows as well as with the size of the original shock. A shock sce-
ario which begins with a sudden reduction in capital for banks
n our data set appears to have the largest negative effect on the
ystem. Let us first consider the scenario in which all banks in the
enelux countries were to suffer from an abrupt loss of 10 per-
ent of their equity and therefore suffer from a reduction of their
ier 1 capital ratio by 10 percent. The systemic consequences then
epend on the size of the spreading parameter, Qa. In the case of
eak spreading, Qa = 0.3, banks from Benelux countries see a total
eduction of their tier 1 capital ratio R of 11.0 percent, barely more
han through the initial shock alone. Banks from all other countries
ill see a reduction in their R of 0.3 percent. This comes out to an
verage reduction in R of 1.1 percent, reflecting that there are far
ewer banks in the Benelux countries than in the rest of Europe. In
I. Vodenska, H. Aoyama, A.P. Becker et al. Journal of Financial Stability 52 (2021) 100803













of  values for the spreading parameter. The size of the initial shock is indicated by th
behavior reminiscent of a second order phase transition, where the critical paramet
around Qa = 0.55. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend
the case of strong spreading, Qa = 0.9, the reduction in tier 1 capital
ratio for banks from Benelux countries is more drastic, amounting
to a total of 16.5 percent. We  also observe a noticeable effect on
banks from other European countries which see their R reduced by
4.1 percent. With larger initial shock size, these numbers become
bigger, but not systemically. This is quite analogous to our previous
discussion in Section 5.3 and reflected in Table 5.
The results are very different, as we have discussed before, if
we consider a steep bank response function. We  recognize two dis-
tinct regimes of the system in Fig. 13, depending on the size of the
spreading parameter. If Qa ≤ 0.5, then the loss in the tier 1 cap-
ital ratios of banks grows, but it grows slowly and steadily with




15r, where from yellow (small shock) to dark purple (very large shock). We observe
e magnitude of the sector spread Qa . The tipping point of the system appears to be
eader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
he same fashion as it has in Fig. 12 for the linear bank response
unction. However, if Qa ≥ 0.6, banks lose, on average, about 75%
f their tier 1 capital ratio. In other words, all banks with less than
8 percent tier 1 capital ratio at the onset of the simulation are in
cute danger of falling the stress test in this scenario. Remarkably,
his behavior is true for all asset classes and bank equity, with the
xception of sovereign debt which we will discuss later. Further-
ore, regardless of the asset class in which the shock originated
nd regardless of the size of the initial shock size, the final tier 1
apital ratio of banks will be the same.
We speculate that the system exhibits a phase transition around
a = 0.55, and as a consequence the banking network can be
xtremely fragile. Below this parameter, an initial shock can be
I. Vodenska, H. Aoyama, A.P. Becker et al. Journal of Financial Stability 52 (2021) 100803











































small  average deterioration of the tier 1 capital ratios of the banks in the system, w
the  two regimes indicates the point of the phase transition. The plot corresponds t
color  in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
quite damaging to banks, however it diminishes over time. Above
this parameter, an initial shock does not diminish as quickly as it
spreads to other sectors of the system. Instead it has the potency
to affect all asset classes and thus all banks.
This sudden switching behavior can be better understood when
considering the slope at the transition as well as the dependence on
the initial shock size leading up to the transition point. We  observe
that the transition is smoothest for a shock to bank equity, followed
by a shock to corporate loans and loans to financial institutions.
Since corporate loans and loans to financial institutions tend to
make up a very large part of the balance sheets of banks, especially
larger banks, a shock to these asset classes is more impactful than
a shock to other asset classes. Likewise, a shock to bank equity of
10 or 20 percent or more is a significant shock. In contrast, a shock
to revolving retail or SME  has only a minor initial impact on many
banks. For the sake of the argument, let’s consider a fairly small
shock to the risk weights of a given asset class. Obviously, no disrup-
tion to a specific asset class by itself by themselves cause a systemic
event because banks are diversified across asset classes and coun-
tries, and therefore a small change to one risk weight will be a
very small change to a bank’s overall risk-weighted assets – and,
in turn, to its tier 1 capital ratio. A systemic event gets underway
if the initial shock can fester for long enough and spread to other
countries and asset classes, increasing the associated risk weights.
In the case of the bigger asset classes (corporate and financial) as
well as equity, the initial shock will have had a measurable impact
already, such that the transition looks less sharp. In the case of the
smaller asset classes (ret. revolving and SME), however, the transi-
tion is very sudden: Below a certain spreading parameter, the shock
remains contained and the possible damage to tier 1 capital ratios
is bounded by the volume of these asset classes; but beyond that
spreading parameter, the shock spreads to all parts of the system.
A notable exception is sovereign debt. Due the low risk weights
and also the idiosyncratic spreading parameters derived from the
CDS swaps, an initial shock within the scope of current risk weights
is often just too small to cause a systemic event. Given a very large
initial shock or very many time steps, a systemic event can, nev-
ertheless, be triggered by a shock to sovereign debt. The value of
Qa for the phase transition, however, may  be very different than
that for the other asset classes. This again reflects the idiosyncratic
spreading parameters.
Fig. 14 shows the dependency of the outcome of the simulation
with respect to the parameters Qa and  ̨ which we  had identi-
fied as critical parameters of the phase transition. We  observe that
there is a sharp boundary between two regimes, one correspond-
ing to the resilient and one corresponding to the fragile phase. If




16s purple indicates the worst attainable stationary state. The bright line separating
ock to loans in the French financial sector. (For interpretation of the references to
witch decreases accordingly. Interpreting the steepness parame-
er as an indicator of risk aversion, this implies that if the market
s fragile, small amounts of risk aversion among the banks may  be
ufficient to topple the system. Conversely, if Qa, a measure related
o the probability of default of the assets, is small, the banking sys-
em is particularly robust, even if banks are very risk averse. Fig. 14
llustrates one specific shock scenario, that of a shock to financial
nstitutions in France; other scenarios yield a similar result with a
mall shift to the regime boundary.
. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we  have analyzed the European Banking Authority
tress test results. We  have created a bipartite network with banks
n one side and assets on the other, based on European banks’ hold-
ngs of sovereign debt from 30 European nations, the United States,
nd Japan. We  have proposed a systemic risk propagation in which
e take into consideration the interconnectivity between banks
ased on the overlap of their asset portfolios. We  have analyzed
he systemic impact of shocks to bank assets by increasing the risk
eight of these assets as well as of shocks to the equity of banks.
oth types of shocks lead to an initial decrease in the tier 1 capital
atio of the affected banks. In our propagation model a deterioration
f the tier 1 capital ratio prompts a reaction of the banks, putting
tress on assets in their portfolio and further enhancing the crisis.
e have considered a linear response of banks to the shock and we
onfirm that banks are more affected by the initial shock than by
ubsequent spillovers. In accordance with Glasserman and Young
2015), we  find no significant contagion, hence the effect of the
hock is locally contained and can be explained by portfolio over-
ap and the size of the initial shock. If, however, the banks’ response
s described by a steeper function, the stability of the banking net-
ork becomes strongly dependent on a spreading parameter. This
preading parameter has a critical value associated with a phase
ransition. Below the critical value, the system exhibits stability
nd is comparable to the linear case: We  observe no spillover and
osses depend on both the size of the initial shock and the origin
f the shock. However, above the critical value the system breaks
own, and we observe a very large deterioration of the tier 1 capital
atio of all banks; in fact most banks fall below the Basel III thresh-
ld. The critical value depends slightly on the origin of the shock
nd the asset class; however, the outcome for the banks beyond
he critical value of the spreading parameter is then independent
f the origin of the shock and of the size of the initial shock.
Our results show that even though the systemic risk propagation
hrough the banking network is homogeneous once strong conta-










Appendix A. Additional tablesI. Vodenska, H. Aoyama, A.P. Becker et al. 
a given bank depends on the origin of the shock, the size of the shock
and its balance sheet. We  suggest that our model is a good comple-
ment to the current stress tests to capture the interconnectivity of
banks due to their portfolio similarities, their business models, and
their regional biases. Understanding these dynamics can be helpful
to regulators as well as policy makers, and it may  serve to inform
the impact of interventions and the lack thereof in times of crisis.
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Table 11
20 largest banks in the data set, sorted by value of assets. The international degree is the 
its  own  country, as shown in Fig. 2. For comparison, the mean and median international d
Ranking Bank Code Bank Name 
1 GB089 HSBC HOLDI
2  FR013 BNP PARIBAS
3  GB088 ROYAL BANK
4  DE017 DEUTSCHE B
5  FR014 CREDIT AGR
6  NL047 ING BANK N
7  ES059 BANCO SANT
8  GB090 BARCLAYS p
9  GB091 LLOYDS BAN
10  IT041 UNICREDIT S
11  FR016 SOCIETE GEN
12  NL048 RABOBANK N
13  ES060 BANCO BILBA
14  IT040 INTESA SANP
15  DE018 COMMERZBA
16  FR015 BPCE 
17  BE004 DEXIA 
18  SE084 Nordea Bank
19  DK008 DANSKE BAN
20  ES061 BFA-BANKIA
Table 12
Effect of a shock that originates in the GIIPS countries. There are a total of 43 banks in the
to  400 percent of their original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio acro
the  GIIPS countries (Loss GIIPS) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks
failing  the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We aga
system  (D100 Total), for the GIIPS countries (D100 GIIPS) and for other than the GIIPS coun
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss A
GIIPS Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 
steep 0.0 
0.9 lin  0.0 
steep 69.0 
400 0.3 lin  0.1 
steep 0.1 
0.9 lin  0.2 
steep 69.0 
Financial 150  0.3 lin 3.3 
steep 4.9 
0.9 lin  10.5 
steep 69.0 
400  0.3 lin 14.7 
steep 18.5 
0.9 lin  30.3 
steep 69.0 
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 10.1 
steep 14.3 
0.9 lin  30.3 
steep 69.0 
400 0.3 lin  23.7 
steep 27.2 
0.9 lin  38.5 
steep 69.0 
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 GIIPS countries. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and
ss the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in
 in other than the GIIPS countries (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks
in count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire
tries (D100 Other).
vg Loss GIIPS Loss Other D100 Total D100 GIIPS D100 Other
0.0 0.0 2 2 0
0.0 0.0 2 2 0
0.0 0.0 2 2 0
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
0.2 0.0 2 2 0
0.2 0.1 2 2 0
0.3 0.1 2 2 0
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
4.7 2.0 2 2 0
6.6 3.2 3 2 1
12.8 8.4 3 2 1
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
20.9 9.0 5 4 1
25.0 12.5 7 6 1
36.4 24.8 20 17 3
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
17.2 3.6 4 3 1
22.6 6.8 8 7 1
39.9 21.6 20 17 3
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
39.0 9.7 21 19 2
41.5 14.1 22 19 3
49.5 28.5 33 29 4
69.0 69.1 87 41 46
I. Vodenska, H. Aoyama, A.P. Becker et al. Journal of Financial Stability 52 (2021) 100803
Table  12 (Continued)
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss GIIPS Loss Other D100 Total D100 GIIPS D100 Other
Ret. Resid. 150 0.3 lin 6.2 11.5 1.3 2 2 0
steep 8.4 14.7 2.6 3 3 0
0.9 lin  16.3 24.2 9.0 7 6 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400  0.3 lin 24.1 42.9 6.8 23 23 0
steep 29.5 48.5 12.1 30 29 1
0.9 lin  42.0 56.9 28.4 37 34 3
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 1.5 3.0 0.2 2 2 0
steep 2.1 3.8 0.5 2 2 0
0.9 lin  3.7 5.9 1.7 2 2 0
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400 0.3 lin  4.1 7.9 0.7 2 2 0
steep 5.2 9.4 1.3 2 2 0
0.9 lin  8.6 13.5 4.2 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
Ret.  SME 150 0.3 lin 3.0 5.5 0.7 2 2 0
steep 4.2 7.1 1.5 2 2 0
0.9 lin  8.4 12.1 5.0 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400 0.3 lin  5.4 9.8 1.3 3 3 0
steep 6.9 11.7 2.5 3 3 0
0.9 lin  11.8 16.8 7.2 6 5 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
Comm.  RE 150 0.3 lin 3.8 6.6 1.2 2 2 0
steep 5.1 8.4 2.1 2 2 0
0.9 lin  10.0 14.0 6.3 4 3 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
400  0.3 lin 6.7 11.7 2.1 2 2 0
steep 8.4 13.7 3.5 4 3 1
0.9 lin  13.7 19.0 8.8 6 5 1
steep 69.0 69.0 69.1 87 41 46
Table 13
Effect of a shock that originates in Eastern Europe. There are a total of 4 banks in Eastern Europe. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400
percent  of their original value. We  show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Eastern
Europe (Loss EE) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other countries than in Eastern Europe (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing
the  stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100
Total), for Eastern Europe (D100 EE) and for other than Eastern Europe countries (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss EE Loss Other D100 Total D100 EE D100 Other
Eastern
Europe
Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400  0.3 lin 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Financial 150  0.3 lin 0.6 4.1 0.4 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.8 0.7 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.9 6.5 1.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 3.2 19.3 2.4 3 0 3
steep 4.4 21.2 3.6 3 0 3
0.9 lin  8.9 26.0 8.1 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 1.8 16.4 1.1 2 0 2
steep 2.5 18.4 1.8 2 0 2
0.9 lin  5.4 23.0 4.6 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 5.0 39.5 3.4 5 2 3
steep 6.6 40.6 5.0 5 2 3
0.9 lin  12.5 43.8 11.0 6 2 4
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.6 7.3 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 8.1 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.8 9.8 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 3.1 28.6 1.9 2 0 2
steep 4.4 31.0 3.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  9.7 37.3 8.4 4 1 3
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
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Table  13 (Continued)
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss EE Loss Other D100 Total D100 EE D100 Other
Ret. Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.4 5.0 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.5 5.7 0.2 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.8 6.7 0.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 0.9 12.7 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 13.4 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.9 14.8 1.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Ret.  SME 150 0.3 lin 0.4 5.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.6 5.9 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.1 7.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400 0.3 lin  0.8 9.8 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 10.5 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.0 12.1 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Comm.  RE 150 0.3 lin 0.3 1.1 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.5 0.5 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 2.5 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
400 0.3 lin  0.7 2.1 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.0 2.7 0.9 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.1 4.4 2.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 67.9 69.1 87 4 83
Table 14
Effect of a shock that originates in the Benelux countries. There are a total of 7 banks in the Benelux countries. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent
and  to 400 percent of their original value. We  show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks
in  the Benelux countries (Loss Benelux) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than the Benelux countries (Loss Other). We also show the number
of  banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the
entire  system (D100 Total), for the Benelux countries (D100 Benelux) and for other than the Benelux countries (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Benelux Loss Other D100 Total D100 Benelux D100 Other
Benelux Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400 0.3 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 72.0 68.8 87 7 80
Financial 150  0.3 lin 0.5 3.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.7 4.1 0.5 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.8 5.5 1.5 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400  0.3 lin 2.3 15.7 1.2 3 0 3
steep 3.5 17.1 2.4 3 0 3
0.9 lin  8.3 21.5 7.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 1.0 5.7 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.8 7.0 1.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  5.3 11.2 4.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400  0.3 lin 3.2 16.8 2.1 4 0 4
steep 5.2 19.0 4.0 4 0 4
0.9 lin  12.7 25.5 11.6 4 0 4
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.8 6.8 0.3 2 0 2
steep 1.2 7.7 0.7 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.2 10.3 2.6 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400 0.3 lin  3.7 28.1 1.7 3 1 2
steep 5.9 31.5 3.7 4 1 3
0.9 lin  14.5 38.6 12.5 5 1 4
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.2 0.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.2 0.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400 0.3 lin  0.2 0.4 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.3 0.5 0.2 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.7 1.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
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Table  14 (Continued)
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Benelux Loss Other D100 Total D100 Benelux D100 Other
Ret. SME  150 0.3 lin 0.3 1.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.4 2.3 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 3.3 1.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400  0.3 lin 0.5 3.8 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.3 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.2 5.9 1.9 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Comm. RE 150 0.3 lin 0.3 2.4 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.5 2.7 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 3.7 1.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
400 0.3 lin  0.6 4.4 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.9 4.9 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.3 6.4 1.9 3 0 3
steep 69.0 71.9 68.8 87 7 80
Table 15
Effect of a shock that originates in Greece. There are a total of 6 banks in Greece. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their
original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Greece (Loss Greece)
as  well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Greece (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1
capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We  again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Greece (D100 Greece)
and  for other than Greece (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Greece Loss Other D100 Total D100 Greece D100 Other
Greece Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 0.0 0.4 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.4 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.5 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 69.0 69.0 87 5 82
Financial 150  0.3 lin 0.5 4.2 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.7 5.1 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.3 6.8 0.9 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400 0.3 lin  2.7 19.8 1.4 2 0 2
steep 3.3 22.1 2.0 3 1 2
0.9 lin  5.8 26.9 4.3 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 1.7 16.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 2.2 19.0 1.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  4.1 25.4 2.6 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 4.3 38.1 1.9 5 2 3
steep 5.1 39.7 2.6 5 2 3
0.9 lin  8.2 44.1 5.6 6 2 4
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.8 10.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 1.1 11.4 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.7 14.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 3.5 38.8 1.0 3 1 2
steep 4.4 42.5 1.7 3 1 2
0.9 lin  7.4 48.8 4.4 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.5 6.4 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.6 7.4 0.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.8 8.9 0.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400 0.3 lin  1.2 15.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 1.4 17.1 0.2 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.0 19.2 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Ret.  SME 150 0.3 lin 0.3 2.9 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.4 3.6 0.2 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.7 5.0 0.4 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400 0.3 lin  0.5 5.2 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.7 6.2 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 8.0 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
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Table  15 (Continued)
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Greece Loss Other D100 Total D100 Greece D100 Other
Comm. RE 150 0.3 lin 0.6 6.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.8 7.1 0.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 9.3 0.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 1.0 10.7 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.3 12.1 0.5 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.0 14.6 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.8 69.0 87 5 82
Table 16
Effect of a shock that originates in Italy. There are a total of 6 banks in Italy. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their original
value.  We  show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Italy (Loss Italy) as well as the
average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Italy (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital ratio drop
below  4.5 percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Italy (D100 Italy) and for other than Italy
(D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Italy Loss Other D100 Total D100 Italy D100 Other
Italy Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400 0.3 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Financial 150  0.3 lin 0.9 5.2 0.7 2 0 2
steep 1.6 6.7 1.3 2 0 2
0.9 lin  4.1 10.5 3.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 4.4 22.9 3.3 3 0 3
steep 6.5 25.9 5.3 3 0 3
0.9 lin  14.7 33.7 13.6 7 3 4
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 2.2 18.8 1.2 2 0 2
steep 3.8 22.4 2.7 5 2 3
0.9 lin  11.2 32.3 10.0 5 2 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400 0.3 lin  5.9 43.1 3.7 7 4 3
steep 8.6 44.5 6.5 7 4 3
0.9 lin  18.7 48.8 16.9 9 4 5
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.8 5.3 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.3 6.5 1.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.3 9.5 3.0 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400 0.3 lin  4.1 25.0 2.9 3 1 2
steep 6.6 29.2 5.3 5 2 3
0.9 lin  16.7 39.7 15.3 8 3 5
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.1 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.4 0.6 0.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 0.2 0.7 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.4 1.0 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.1 1.9 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Ret.  SME  150 0.3 lin 0.6 6.7 0.3 2 0 2
steep 1.1 8.0 0.7 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.9 11.2 2.4 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 1.2 12.1 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.9 13.5 1.2 2 0 2
0.9 lin  4.5 16.8 3.8 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
Comm. RE 150 0.3 lin 0.8 7.4 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.3 8.7 0.8 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.2 12.0 2.7 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
400  0.3 lin 1.5 13.1 0.8 2 0 2
steep 2.2 14.5 1.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  5.0 17.8 4.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 66.1 69.2 87 5 82
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Table  17
Effect of a shock that originates in France. There are a total of 4 banks in France. We  simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their
original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in France (Loss France)
as  well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than France (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1
capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for France (D100 France) and
for  other than France (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss France Loss Other D100 Total D100 France D100 Other
France Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
400 0.3 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
Financial 150 0.3 lin  0.3 1.6 0.3 2 0 2
steep 0.6 2.0 0.6 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.8 3.4 1.7 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 1.9 8.8 1.5 2 0 2
steep 3.3 10.6 3.0 3 0 3
0.9 lin  8.8 16.1 8.5 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 1.2 8.8 0.9 2 0 2
steep 2.4 10.6 2.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  7.6 16.7 7.2 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400 0.3 lin  3.7 23.8 2.8 2 0 2
steep 6.2 25.9 5.3 4 0 4
0.9 lin  15.7 32.3 14.9 5 1 4
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.6 3.3 0.5 2 0 2
steep 1.1 4.1 1.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.2 6.7 3.1 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 3.3 15.9 2.7 2 0 2
steep 5.7 19.5 5.1 3 0 3
0.9 lin  16.1 29.7 15.4 5 1 4
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.1 0.5 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.2 0.6 0.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.5 1.0 0.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 0.3 1.4 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.8 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.5 3.0 1.5 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Ret.  SME  150 0.3 lin 0.3 2.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.6 3.2 0.5 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.9 4.8 1.8 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400 0.3 lin  0.6 4.9 0.4 2 0 2
steep 1.1 5.7 0.9 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.2 8.0 3.0 3 0 3
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
Comm.  RE 150 0.3 lin 0.3 1.0 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 1.3 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.4 2.4 1.3 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.1 69.1 87 4 83
400  0.3 lin 0.5 2.0 0.4 2 0 2
.9 steep 00.9 lin  2.5 
steep 69.0 
222.5 0.8 2 0 2
4.4 2.5 3 0 3
68.1 69.1 87 4 83
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Table  18
Effect of a shock that originates in Germany. There are a total of 12 banks in Germany. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of
their  original value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Germany (Loss
Germany) as well as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Germany (Loss Other). We also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having
their  tier 1 capital ratio drop below 4.5 percent: We  again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Germany
(D100 Germany) and for other than Germany (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Germany Loss Other D100 Total D100 Germany D100 Other
Germany Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.1 0.0 2 0 2
400 0.3 lin  0.0 0.2 0.0 2 0 2
steep 0.0 0.3 0.0 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 69.0 69.0 87 11 76
Financial 150 0.3 lin  2.5 14.0 0.7 3 1 2
steep 3.7 16.6 1.7 3 1 2
0.9 lin  9.2 24.0 6.9 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400  0.3 lin 8.5 44.5 3.0 6 4 2
steep 10.9 45.8 5.6 6 4 2
0.9 lin  21.2 50.4 16.7 8 5 3
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 3.0 13.5 1.4 3 1 2
steep 4.9 16.5 3.1 3 1 2
0.9 lin  12.8 25.8 10.8 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400 0.3 lin  8.1 33.4 4.3 3 1 2
steep 11.3 35.7 7.5 3 1 2
0.9 lin  22.4 42.5 19.3 6 2 4
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 0.8 1.6 0.6 2 0 2
steep 1.3 2.3 1.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  3.5 4.8 3.2 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400  0.3 lin 4.2 8.6 3.5 3 1 2
steep 6.9 12.2 6.1 3 1 2
0.9 lin  18.1 24.4 17.1 4 1 3
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.1 0.2 0.1 2 0 2
steep 0.1 0.3 0.1 2 0 2
0.9 lin  0.4 0.6 0.4 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400  0.3 lin 0.3 0.6 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.5 0.9 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.3 1.7 1.2 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Ret.  SME  150 0.3 lin 0.2 0.3 0.2 2 0 2
steep 0.4 0.5 0.4 2 0 2
0.9 lin  1.2 1.4 1.1 2 0 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400 0.3 lin  0.4 0.5 0.4 2 0 2
steep 0.8 1.0 0.8 2 0 2
0.9 lin  2.2 2.6 2.1 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
Comm.  RE 150 0.3 lin 1.2 5.7 0.5 3 1 2
steep 1.8 7.0 1.0 3 1 2
0.9 lin  4.5 10.5 3.6 3 1 2
steep 69.0 68.9 69.0 87 11 76
400  0.3 lin 2.1 10.4 0.9 3 1 2
steep 3.1 0.9 lin  6.8 
steep 69.0 
2311.8 1.8 3 1 2
15.7 5.5 3 1 2
68.9 69.0 87 11 76
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Table  19
Effect of a shock that originates in Spain. There are a total of 25 banks in Spain. We simulate a sudden increase of risk weights to 150 percent and to 400 percent of their
original  value. We show the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio across the entire system (Loss Avg), the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in Spain (Loss Spain) as
well  as the average loss in tier 1 capital ratio for banks in other than Spain (Loss Other). We  also show the number of banks failing the stress test by having their tier 1 capital
ratio  drop below 4.5 percent: We again count the total number of distressed banks after 100 time steps for the entire system (D100 Total), for Spain (D100 Spain) and for other
than  Spain (D100 Other).
Origin Sector Shock Size (%) QA P(x) Loss Avg Loss Spain Loss Other D100 Total D100 Spain D100 Other
Spain Sov. Debt 150 0.3 lin 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
0.9 lin  0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 1 1
400 0.3 lin  0.0 0.1 0.0 2 1 1
steep 0.0 0.2 0.0 2 1 1
0.9 lin  0.1 0.2 0.0 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Financial 150 0.3 lin  1.4 4.2 0.3 2 1 1
steep 2.0 5.7 0.6 2 1 1
0.9 lin  4.2 9.4 2.1 3 1 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400  0.3 lin 6.6 19.3 1.7 3 2 1
steep 8.5 22.9 2.9 5 3 2
0.9 lin  15.0 31.7 8.6 9 7 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Corporate 150 0.3 lin 5.2 17.1 0.6 3 2 1
steep 7.3 22.1 1.6 5 4 1
0.9 lin  15.4 35.5 7.7 11 9 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400 0.3 lin  12.2 39.0 1.9 11 10 1
steep 14.1 41.3 3.6 12 10 2
0.9 lin  21.7 48.1 11.5 17 15 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Ret.  Resid. 150 0.3 lin 3.8 12.9 0.3 2 1 1
steep 5.1 16.2 0.8 3 2 1
0.9 lin  9.7 24.7 3.9 5 3 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400  0.3 lin 14.0 46.7 1.4 16 15 1
steep 16.9 52.0 3.5 21 19 2
0.9 lin  25.3 58.3 12.6 22 20 2
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Ret.  Rev. 150 0.3 lin 0.9 3.2 0.0 2 1 1
steep 1.2 4.1 0.2 2 1 1
0.9 lin  2.2 6.0 0.7 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400  0.3 lin 2.5 8.7 0.1 2 1 1
steep 3.2 10.4 0.4 2 1 1
0.9 lin  5.3 14.1 1.9 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Ret.  SME  150 0.3 lin 1.8 6.2 0.1 2 1 1
steep 2.3 7.6 0.3 2 1 1
0.9 lin  4.1 11.1 1.4 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
400 0.3 lin  3.2 11.0 0.2 3 2 1
steep 3.9 12.7 0.5 3 2 1
0.9 lin  6.1 16.3 2.2 3 2 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
Comm.  RE 150 0.3 lin 1.9 6.4 0.2 2 1 1
steep 2.5 7.9 0.4 2 1 1
0.9 lin  4.3 11.5 1.6 2 1 1
steep 69.0 69.3 68.9 87 24 63
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